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Banks: A Broken Social Contract
Mehrsa Baradaran, J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia
School of Law

The first symptoms of cancer can be mistaken for any mundane sickness—
fatigue, fever, bloating, headaches. You can treat these symptoms for
months—even years—while the cancer grows undetected. Sometimes, you
treat the symptoms for so long that by the time the cause—the aggressive
tumor—is detected, it’s too late and all you can do is just keep treating the
symptoms.
Financial crises are akin to cancer symptoms. Though the crisis and ensuing
panic is itself painful, the root problem is often less obvious, but much more
consequential. As the dust has settled on the 2008 crisis and the ensuing
reforms, it’s time to ask: Did we treat the disease or just its symptoms?
The crisis is best understood in historical context. Specifically, the latest epoch
of banking policy has been one of deregulation. The banks asked to be free
from the heavy legal restrictions and regulations imposed after the Great
Depression, and the politicians obliged. To be sure, many of the restrictions
needed to be updated or repealed. And they were. But as the banks were
deregulated, a new philosophy began to dominate the academy, industry, and
the minds of policymakers. The theory was that the country would benefit
from a competitive and profitable banking system, which was possible only if
government stayed out of the business of banking. Policymakers took
figurative—and, in one famous photo‐op of leading banking regulators—
literal chainsaws to regulations with the assumption that a competitive
banking sector could regulate its own excesses and that the “market” would

punish weak banks with failure and strong banks with profits. Indeed, firms
were profitable for many years and they became more efficient as they left
low‐profit areas like poor inner city and rural neighborhoods and formed
conglomerates that could lower costs through scale and scope. Few insiders
questioned the new philosophy in flush times, but when the music stopped, it
became clear just how much government intervention had stood between the
banks and the abyss.
The crisis revealed three specific problems. The first was that the banks and
non‐bank financial institutions created due to deregulation were huge,
interconnected, and highly leveraged. Their size meant that their failure could
take down major portions of the economy and hurt undeserving victims such
as pension fund holders and savers. They were, in other words, Too Big To
Fail (TBTF). As it turned out, no one had the stomach to stick to market
discipline in the foxhole. Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke brought in all the
top bankers and forced them to take a bailout. Once it was clear that AIG’s
massive shortfall threatened the entire economy, there was no choice but to
do everything possible to prevent it, including the federal government buying
the firm.
Second, the panic started in the “shadow banking” sector and showed that the
short‐term credit transactions and derivatives that non‐bank financial
institutions traded and used for funding for years were similar to banking, and
thus prone to runs. Lehman failed overnight because its creditors acted like
the townsfolk of Bedford Falls demanding their money from Bailey’s Building
& Loan lest it fail by morning. Except these shadow banks were unregulated
and unprotected by the FDIC. As this country figured out the hard way during

the Great Depression, creditor confidence is psychological, and only
government intervention in the form of FDIC insurance can stop bank runs.
Third, the entire premise of deregulation rested on an assumption that
individual firms and market players could accurately calculate and manage
risks, or “self‐regulate.” Every firm had a risk management team made up of
lots of math Ph.D.s, or “quants,” who would run data‐driven “stress tests” or
calculate Value at Risk, and once they had a handle on risks of loss, they could
hedge that risk with insurance. Who sold all of that insurance? AIG. Regulators
didn’t get too involved, and they outsourced a lot of their typical supervisory
duties to firms’ internal risk models, confident that the market could
rationally digest information and punish without externalities. As it turned
out, those models could be overly optimistic and market discipline could be
erratic and ignorant.
So did Dodd‐Frank fix these problems?
Policymakers have repeatedly promised that Dodd‐Frank did away with
TBTF, but that’s not fully accurate. Here’s what Dodd‐Frank does: Each firm
has to submit a “living will” that lays out a plan for how it can be liquidated in
the event of its failure, without causing chaos or requiring a bailout. The
regulators recently reviewed these plans and determined that five out of the
largest eight banks do not have a credible plan to avoid financial chaos or
government rescue in the event of a failure. In other words, they are still too
big to fail. So it’s back to the drawing board for the banks.
Dodd‐Frank also amended the Federal Reserve’s emergency bailout authority
outlined in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. It can no longer save just
one firm the way it did during the crisis—it would have to create a fund with

“broad‐based eligibility.” The catch is that the banks that emerged from the
crisis are bigger and fewer in number. So even if a broad‐based fund were
created, the beneficiaries would likely be the same players as in 2008.
Moreover, it’s hard to believe that if we faced another potential abyss,
policymakers would not act forcefully to prevent the feared widespread
catastrophe. It’s not as though the Fed or the Treasury felt bound by law when
it administered the 2008 bailout, stretching the Fed’s emergency powers to
the breaking point.
As for shadow banking, the biggest step has been to identify the scale and
nature of the problem. By my count, Federal Reserve Board officials
mentioned shadow banking in exactly zero speeches from 2003 to 2008 and
in 20 percent of their speeches from 2010 to 2016. Just talking about the
problem 20 percent of the time as opposed to zero is a huge leap toward
addressing it. Dodd‐Frank also created a new super‐regulator, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, to oversee any large institution that looks and
smells like a bank. The Fed will then supervise any non‐bank that the council
designates as a Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI). Already
this designation has faced a setback as a D.C. court, overconfident and
suffering from amnesia about the systemic risk non‐banks can cause,
overturned MetLife’s SIFI designation. Other SIFIs are said to be lining up to
challenge their designation as well.
As for those risk management models, the Fed doubled down on them and
brought them in‐house. Even as the intellectual father of free markets and
deregulation, Alan Greenspan, admitted there was a flaw in his assumptions
about market discipline, the foundational theory of risk management was not
thrown out. One of Dodd‐Frank’s most significant regulatory changes is the

annual stress testing of large firms. The Fed, using its own risk model based
on historical data, runs each firm through a stress test to project if it can
survive a shock. The good news is that the Fed is no longer deferring to pure
“self‐regulation,” the test’s “financial shocks,” or stressors, are worse than
what the firms were modeling before 2008, and every firm is subject to the
test with results made public. However, the Fed’s stress testing is built on the
same foundation as the faulty risk management enterprise—the assumption
that we have enough information today to design a hypothetical scenario that
would accurately predict and prepare for a system‐wide panic tomorrow.
There are many reasons this premise is dubious, not least of which is that the
firms were essentially doing this for years before the crisis and their models
missed huge problems.
Even as Dodd‐Frank has attempted to fix the major problems the crisis
revealed, the law falls short of real reform. In some ways, that is because in
tone and structure, Dodd‐Frank has more in common with the deregulatory
laws of the last 30 years than with the reforms of the New Deal era or even the
recent post‐crisis populist sentiment. When policymakers were faced with the
choice to make structural or incremental changes, they chose incremental.
They didn’t break up the banks or cause a significant restructuring of their
business model. Regulators also chose complexity over simpler tools of
reform—technical fixes over a system overhaul. (The one major counterpoint
in Dodd‐Frank is the creation of Elizabeth Warren’s Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, which is a major structural reform aimed at protecting
people against financial industry excess. The agency has been vilified by the
financial sector since its inception, but like its founder, the agency has been
strong and, as far as we know, uncorrupted.)

More consequentially, policymakers probed no further than the crisis
required. They identified the symptoms and are working on treating them, but
missed the cancer that is still growing. They did not realize that this was not
just a narrow banking crisis to be fixed through banking regulation.
Indeed, banking policy has always implicated much more than just bank
safety, but also affects social policy, democracy, and the creation or
elimination of inequality. Alexander Hamilton thought that banks would be
the most important instrument of public policy. Thomas Jefferson said that
banks were more dangerous than standing armies and sought to reduce their
power over the common man. Andrew Jackson waged a misguided “bank war”
against the national bank because he believed that the national bank was
about “the advancement of the few at the expense of the many.” After the
crisis of 1907, Woodrow Wilson called for the end of the “monopoly of big
credits” that would hinder “the true liberties of men.” After the Great
Depression, Louis Brandeis declared that the nation’s banks should be treated
as a “public utility” instead of a “private affair” because banks gain their
disproportionate power through the use of “other people’s money.” FDR
excoriated the banking system proclaiming that “the rulers of the exchange of
mankind’s goods have failed” and “the unscrupulous money changers stand
indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of
men.” Roosevelt saw the crisis as a threat to the “future of essential
democracy” and took it as a mandate to use “direct, vigorous action” to fight
for “the social values more noble than mere monetary profit.”
These leaders may have been wrong in their specific proposals, but they each
understood something that current lawmakers are missing: Banking
regulation is just as much about liberty, democracy, equal opportunity, and

equality as it is about risk or liquidity. We need to make sure banks are
operating safely, but we also need to make sure they are serving the people.
While Washington and Wall Street proclaimed after the bailouts that “we were
all in this together,” the effects of the financial crisis were largely borne by the
poor and middle‐class people who were foreclosed upon even as the banks
were being bailed out. As it turned out, we did not rise and fall together. Wall
Street is rising and the public continues to fall. The last ten years have been
defined by historic inequality, the rise of true poverty in America, and a
growing racial wealth gap. What the Obama Administration ignored is what
was central in previous post‐crisis responses: that inequality and banking
policy are entwined. Without state intervention, credit naturally flows to the
wealthy.
Against the backdrop of widespread foreclosures, job losses, economic
stagnation, and a growing wealth gap, Dodd‐Frank seems weak and narrow,
technical to a fault, trees instead of forest. Even if the legislation had managed
to regulate shadow banking effectively, fixed TBTF, and gotten systemic risk
under control, it failed to recognize the cancer underneath. Wall Street’s gains
are not Main Street’s gains, but its losses are Main Street’s losses.
The cancer is that we have a broken social contract—the public supports the
bank, but the banks aren’t obliged or interested in supporting the public. In
fact, after the crisis several insiders revealed that in fact some traders viewed
their clients as prey. Dark pools were created to front‐run customer orders,
and some firms were shorting the very investments they had induced their
clients to buy. The Panama Papers show what many have suspected—that the
major banks are helping high net‐worth clients evade laws as well as

potentially billions of dollars in tax revenue. Meanwhile, these same firms are
lobbying heavily to destroy regulations that protect the public. This is not as
hard as it sounds. Currently, there are five financial industry lobbyists on
Capitol Hill for every one legislator.
The last crisis revealed overlooked problems in the financial system. Since
those problems have been identified, they will not easily be ignored in the
future. Now we need to work on addressing the reason regulators missed the
problems for so long—namely, that they believed in the dogma that
government should not intervene in any way that threatened bank profits,
that the banks could manage their own risks, and that it was possible for the
government to stay out of it when banks failed. We need to reignite if not the
fight at least the healthy debate of industry versus public that has long been
central in banking policy. We need to be realistic about what banks are: the
central engines of democracy, and therefore necessarily tied to the state. They
are not the enemy, but they do have public responsibilities that we ignore at
our peril.

